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ADDRESSING LONG WAITS FOR HOME AND COMMUNITY-
BASED CARE THROUGH MEDICAID AND THE ADA 
JANE PERKINS* AND RANDOLPH T. BOYLE** 
Tami has complex ophthalmic, orthopedic, gastro-intestinal and neurological 
care needs. Her doctors say it is a miracle she has reached age six.  Tami 
cannot talk or walk, and she needs ongoing physical therapy.  Tami is bed-
ridden and needs twenty-four-hour care.  She lives at home, communicating 
through eye movements and interacting as an important member of her family.  
Tami’s private insurance has been covering her home health care, but it has 
now reached its limits.  Tami’s family is looking to the Medicaid program to 
cover the care that Tami needs, but Medicaid says it will pay for only seven 
hours of home care each day. 
Daniel is fourteen years old.  He suffers from emotional illness, including 
psychoses and depression.  Prior to October 1999, he was cared for by in-home 
workers, funded through Medicaid.  He was functioning well.  However, the 
Medicaid agency cut back on his coverage.  Daniel’s condition deteriorated, 
and he was initially placed in a state psychiatric hospital.  Subsequently, he has 
been bouncing between the hospital and residential group home settings—a 
scenario which will likely continue unless his Medicaid home-based care is 
reinstated. 
Chad is a thirty-two-year-old man with traumatic brain injury.  With home 
health and personal care assistance, Chad can live in his own apartment.  
However, his condition demands consistency and a focus on social behavior.  
Unfortunately, the individuals who are providing services to Chad through the 
Medicaid program are untrained and have exhibited inappropriate behavior.  
On one occasion, Chad’s mother was summoned to the apartment, only to find 
a nineteen-year-old care provider passed out on the sofa, naked from the waist 
down with beer cans strewn around him. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
These stories are taken from the docket of cases recently handled by the 
National Health Law Program, a public interest law firm.  While the 
differences in these cases are apparent, there are common threads running 
 
* Jane Perkins, J.D., M.P.H., is Director of Legal Affairs at the National Health Law Program. 
** Randolph T. Boyle, J.D., is a Staff Attorney at the National Health Law Program. 
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through them.  All of these individuals are disabled, of limited income, and 
dependent on the state Medicaid program to cover the costs of their necessary 
health care.  Each has ongoing health care needs.  None of them needs to be 
institutionalized, however, because each can be cared for in less restrictive 
home and community-based settings.  All three cases raise a number of 
troubling questions about how state Medicaid agencies are implementing 
federal requirements for covering home and community-based services. 
This article focuses on the growing advocacy movement to identify and 
address these issues.  These efforts represent a progression in advocacy, which 
has previously focused on improving conditions for those living in institutions 
and, more recently, evolved to target the elimination of unnecessary 
institutionalization.1  Building upon these activities, individuals with 
disabilities, their families and advocates are now seeking to improve the scope, 
availability and quality of home and community-based services, particularly 
for persons with limited incomes who are dependent on the Medicaid program.  
Parts II and III of this article provide an overview of health care needs and 
Medicaid eligibility and services for persons needing home based care.  In Part 
IV of the article, recent and ongoing federal court cases will be used to 
illustrate how provisions of the Medicaid Act are being used to expand and 
improve the availability of home and community-based services.  Part V of the 
article discusses the growing importance of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act and the Rehabilitation Act in securing appropriate home and community-
based services. 
II. THE CHANGING FACE OF HEALTH CARE DELIVERY 
Health care today is quite different from the care provided thirty-five years 
ago, when Medicaid was enacted into law.  At that time, health care—and, 
thus, Medicaid—was heavily focused on the provision of institutionally-based 
services.2  Over the past three decades, remarkable technological and 
 
 1. See, e.g., Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999); Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 
F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 1995).  Advocacy also has focused on challenging denials of Medicaid 
eligibility and services for individual claimants.  See, e.g., Ash v. Ohio Dep’t of Human Servs., 
709 N.E.2d 1257 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998); Leach v. Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. Dep’t of 
Med. Assistance Servs., No. 1925-94-2, 1995 WL 495907 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 1995); Madsen 
v. Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 755 P.2d 479 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988). 
 2. See, e.g., NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION 
OF PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES: A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT FOR 
LEGISLATORS 2-4 (2000), available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/Forum/pub6683.htm 
[hereinafter NATIONAL CONFERENCE]; AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE MUNICIPAL AND 
COUNTY EMPLOYEES, OPENING NEW DOORS: THE TRANSITION FROM INSTITUTIONAL TO 
COMMUNITY CARE 1-2 (1999), available at http://www.afscme.org/pol-leg/opend02.htm 
[hereinafter AMERICAN FEDERATION]; Fred Thomas, Ambulatory and Community-Based 
Services, 20 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 1 (1999). 
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pharmacological advances have occurred.3  Individuals who would not have 
lived thirty-five years ago are living today.  Many of these individuals have 
complex medical needs while others—particularly adolescents—present an 
intertwined array of psycho-social problems that are difficult to treat.4  Many 
of these individuals are able to live and be cared for at home.5 
While often less expensive than institutional care, home and community-
based care is still a financial drain on families.  Private insurance provides 
limited assistance in terms of the amount as well as depth of coverage provided 
and the length of time that benefits are offered.6  As a result, Medicaid is 
increasingly being looked upon to cover the costs of providing institutional and 
community-based services.  Medicaid is now the single largest payment source 
for the developmentally disabled, and it is the program that many persons with 
mental illness and mental retardation rely upon.7  Caring for these individuals 
has become expensive, costing Medicaid over $18 billion in 1995.8 
Not surprisingly, Medicaid agencies are looking for ways to control costs.  
Most states have reduced costly institutional care by shifting some public 
funding to home and community settings.  They have done so, in part, through 
the use of Medicaid home and community-based waivers.9  However, states 
have taken these actions delicately, concerned that people who are being cared 
for in institutions or by family members will “come out of the woodwork” and 
place heavy demands on limited Medicaid budgets.  As a result, most states 
offer only limited numbers of waiver slots, for example.  Thus, Medicaid 
beneficiaries, who would otherwise qualify for community-based care, are 
placed on waiting lists when these slots become full. 
Moreover, states have enjoyed almost unchecked flexibility in how they 
administer their home and community-based services as long as the federal 
government does not find the states’ actions to be illegal or too expensive.  
States have caused waiting lists for home health services to grow by decreasing 
the number of slots allocated to their waiver programs and by keeping 
allocated slots unfilled.  States have failed otherwise to provide children and 
 
 3. See, e.g., THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED , LONG-TERM 
CARE: MEDICAID’S ROLE AND CHALLENGES 3 (1999), available at http://www.kff.org 
[hereinafter KAISER COMMISSION]. 
 4. See, e.g., Paul W. Newacheck, An Epidemiologic Profile of Children with Special Health 
Care Needs, 102 PEDIATRICS 117 (1998). 
 5. See, e.g., ROBERT PROUTY & K. CHARLIE LAKIN, RESIDENTIAL SERVICES FOR PERSONS 
WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES STATUS AND TRENDS THROUGH 1998 (1999) (on file with 
the University of Minnesota, Research and Training Center on Community Living, Institute on 
Community Integration) (stating that the number of individuals with developmental disabilities in 
public institutions has declined from 149,892 in 1977 to 51,485 in 1999). 
 6. KAISER COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 6-10. 
 7. NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 7. 
 8. Id. at 8. 
 9. See discussion infra Part IV. 
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nursing-home eligible adults with medically necessary, Medicaid-covered 
home care services.  States are also allowing home care facilities to operate 
with inadequate direct care staff, and Medicaid beneficiaries cannot find 
qualified home care providers.  Beneficiaries and their advocates are 
increasingly asking whether these situations violate the Medicaid Act. 
The need to clarify the role of Medicaid in providing home and 
community-based services has been made even more pressing by a recent U.S. 
Supreme Court decision.  In Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring,10  the Court held 
the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits states from unnecessarily 
institutionalizing persons with disabilities in their public programs.11  Among 
other things, L.C. found a need for states to have a “comprehensive, effectively 
working plan” for placing qualified individuals in less restrictive settings and 
waiting lists that move at a “reasonable pace.”12  As states develop these 
comprehensive plans, institutional placements over a range of settings will 
require review.  For example, states will need to assess whether persons have 
been inappropriately placed in state psychiatric hospitals, nursing homes, 
intermediate care level facilities or prisons.  Accordingly, Medicaid will play a 
central role.  Not only do state Medicaid programs receive and provide major 
funding for both institutional and home and community-based services, but 
those who qualify for Medicaid have a legal entitlement to receive appropriate 
services as required by the Medicaid Act.13 
III. OVERVIEW OF THE MEDICAID PROGRAM FOR INDIVIDUALS NEEDING 
HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED CARE 
A. Medicaid eligibility—fitting into a category 
Not all persons who are poor and who need home health care are eligible 
for Medicaid.  Rather, to obtain a Medicaid card, an individual must have 
limited income and fit into an eligibility category.  For persons with ongoing 
home health care needs, five eligibility categories are used most frequently. 
First, in most states, individuals who are receiving Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI) on the basis of disability automatically qualify for Medicaid.14  
 
 10. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).  This case is often referred to as Olmstead; however, in this article, 
it is called L.C., to acknowledge the plaintiffs. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 605-06. 
 13. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
 14. See id. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(II).  SSI was created in 1972 to provide cash assistance to 
the aged, blind and disabled who have limited income and resources.  SSI provides a uniform 
federal payment, and states have the option to supplement this payment.  Eleven states do not 
provide Medicaid automatically to persons receiving SSI.  Under section 1902(f) of the Social 
Security Act, these states use their 1972 state assistance eligibility rules in determining Medicaid 
eligibility.  See Social Security Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 209(b), 86 Stat. 
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To be disabled, a person must have a “medically determinable physical or 
mental impairment which results in marked and severe functional limitation, 
and which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be 
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.”15 
The second and third likely eligibility categories involve children who are 
not living with their biological parents.  State Medicaid programs must cover 
all children who qualify for title IV-E foster care payments.16  States that 
participate in title IV-E adoption assistance also are required to provide 
Medicaid as part of the adoption assistance.17  Children in these mandatory 
eligibility groups are important for purposes of home and community-based 
services because they are more likely than others to have suffered neglect or 
abuse and to have behavioral health care needs.18 
Fourth, states may choose to cover disabled children (age eighteen or 
younger) who are living at home and do not qualify for SSI or state 
supplementary payments because their parents’ incomes are too high.19  States 
choosing this option are allowed to waive rules for counting parental income 
which otherwise would make the child ineligible for Medicaid.20  States may 
exercise this option only if: (a) the child would qualify for SSI or state 
supplementary payments if he or she were in a medical institution; (b) the child 
requires a hospital or nursing facility level of care; (c) home care is medically 
and otherwise appropriate; and (d) the estimated cost of home care would not 
exceed the estimated cost of appropriate institutional care.21 
 
1381 (1972).  The states are referred to as “209(b) states.”  The eleven states are Connecticut, 
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma 
and Virginia. 
 15. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
 16. See id. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(I) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).  Children are eligible for Title 
IV-E payments if their biological parents would have qualified for AFDC under the AFDC rules 
in effect on July 16, 1996.  States have the option to extend Medicaid to other groups of children 
in foster care.  See id. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(VIII). 
 17. See id. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(I). 
 18. See, e.g., Committee on Early Childhood, Adoption, and Dependent Care, 
Developmental Issues in Foster Care for Children, 91 PEDIATRICS 1007 (1993); Neal Halfon & 
Linnea Klee, Health and Developmental Services for Children with Multiple Needs: Children in 
Foster Care, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 71 (1991); Neil J. Hochstadt, The Medical and 
Psychosocial Needs of Children Entering Foster Care, 11 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 53 (1987). 
 19. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(e)(3) (1994).  This option is sometimes referred to as the “Katie 
Beckett option.”  Under SSI rules, an institutionalized individual is not considered to be living in 
the same household as his or her parents or spouse after the first full month of institutionalization.  
20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1161a, 416.1204a (1998).  Therefore, children whose parents’ incomes or 
resources would place them above SSI limits if they lived at home often would be eligible for 
SSI, and thus, Medicaid, if they were institutionalized. 
 20. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(e)(3) (1994). 
 21. Id. 
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States also have the option of covering medically needy individuals who fit 
into a federal benefit program category, such as the aged, blind or disabled, but 
whose income or resources are above the eligibility levels for the benefit 
program.22  Such individuals can qualify for Medicaid if their incomes, minus 
incurred medical expenses, are less than the state’s medically needy income 
and resource levels.23  While states have a great deal of flexibility in how they 
operate their medically needy programs, states choosing this option must 
include ambulatory services for children under age eighteen.24 
B. The Medicaid benefit package—home and community-based services 
A state that participates in the Medicaid program and receives federal 
matching funds for its Medicaid expenditures must comply with the provisions 
of the Medicaid Act and the regulations governing the program promulgated 
by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.25  The Medicaid Act requires 
states to cover a number of home based services and allows states to cover 
others.  This section of the article reviews these mandatory and optional 
services. 
1. Mandatory home health services 
The Medicaid Act requires states to provide for the “inclusion of home 
health services for any individual who, under the state plan, is entitled to 
nursing facility services.”26  These are individuals twenty-one and older who 
are categorically needy.  These individuals also include the medically needy if 
the state covers nursing facility services in its medically needy program.  
Children under age twenty-one who are found to need nursing facility services 
through the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) 
program are also included (described below).27  For other Medicaid 
beneficiaries, the state has the option whether or not to cover home health 
services. 
 
 22. See id. § 1396a(a)(10)(C).  The following jurisdictions have medically needy programs: 
California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, 
Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin.  States electing the 209(b) option, see Social Security 
Act § 209(b), supra note 14, must have a medically needy program for the aged, blind and 
disabled.  42 U.S.C. § 1396a(f) (1994). 
 23. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1994). 
 24. See id. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(C)(ii), (iii). 
 25. See, e.g., Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 502 (1990).  All states have 
elected to participate in Medicaid. 
 26. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(D) (1994). 
 27. See discussion infra Part III.B.3. 
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State Medicaid programs must cover the following home health services: 
(1) nursing services on a part time or intermittent basis, (2) home health aids, 
and (3) medical supplies.28  The state may cover physical therapy, occupational 
therapy, speech pathology and audiology services.29 
2. Optional home care services for adults 
Medicaid allows states to cover and receive federal matching funds for 
other home care services for individuals aged twenty-one and older.  The most 
important of these services for individuals needing home and community-
based care are: private duty nursing services,30 physical therapy and related 
services,31 “other diagnostic, screening, preventive and rehabilitative 
services,”32 personal care services,33 case-management services34 and 
respiratory care services for specified ventilator dependent individuals.35 
Medicaid also includes as an optional service home and community care 
for low income “functionally disabled elderly individuals.”36  This service 
allows the state to provide a range of services, including homemaker/home 
health aide services, chore services, personal care services, nursing care 
services, respite care, training for family members in managing the individual, 
adult day care and day treatment for persons with chronic mental illness.37  
Functional disability is determined by the elderly individual’s need for 
assistance with activities of daily living (e.g. toileting, transferring or eating) or 
by having a diagnosis of Alzheimer’s Disease and a need for assistance with 
daily living.38  Funds for this program are limited to a specified appropriation 
each year.39 
 
 28. See 42 C.F.R. § 440.70 (1998).  The Medicaid beneficiary does not need to be 
homebound in order to receive home health services.  Letter from Timothy M. Westmoreland, 
Director, Center for Medicaid and State Operations, Health Care Financing Administration, and 
Thomas Perez, Director, Office of Civil Rights, to State Medicaid Directors attach. 3-g (July 25, 
2000), available at http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/olmstead/smdltrs.htm. 
 29. 42 C.F.R. § 440.70(b)(4). 
 30. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(8) (1994). 
 31. See id. § 1396d(a)(11). 
 32. See id. § 1396d(a)(13).  This includes “any medical or remedial services (provided in a 
facility, a home, or other setting) recommended by a physician or other licensed practitioner of 
the healing arts within the scope of their practice under State law, for the maximum reduction of 
physical or mental disability and restoration of an individual to the best possible functional level.” 
Id. 
 33. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(24) (1994). 
 34. See id. §§ 1396d(a)(19), 1396n(g)(2). 
 35. See id. §§ 1396d(a)(20), 1396a(e)(9). 
 36. See id. §§ 1396d(a)(22), 1396t. 
 37. See id. § 1396t(a). 
 38. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396t(c) (1994). 
 39. Id.; 42 U.S.C §§ 1396t(e), (m) (1994 and Supp. III 1997). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
124 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45:117 
States can also elect to provide “community supported living arrangements 
services” for the developmentally disabled.40  This option allows the state to 
choose among the following services: personal assistance, training and 
habilitation services, twenty-four-hour emergency assistance, assistive 
technology, adaptive equipment and supportive services needed to aid an 
individual to participate in community activities.41  Developmental disability is 
decided based on the individual’s condition and on their living arrangements.42  
Funds for the program are limited to specified annual appropriations.43 
3. Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment services for 
children 
The Medicaid Act requires states to provide comprehensive Early and 
Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) services to 
categorically eligible children under age twenty-one.44  As part of EPSDT, 
states must provide eligible children with health care, diagnostic services, 
treatment, and other measures “to correct or ameliorate defects and physical 
and mental illnesses and conditions.”45  The state must include within the 
scope of EPSDT benefits any service that it potentially could cover for adults 
under the Medicaid Act, even if it does not in fact cover that service for adults.  
This means that otherwise optional services, such as personal care services, 
case management services, rehabilitation services, the optional home health 
care services and physical and related therapies, must be covered for a child 
when needed to correct or ameliorate their condition.46  Moreover, the state 
must “arrang[e] for . . . corrective treatment” for children’s identified needs.47  
Thus, while the state generally is required only to pay for Medicaid-covered 
services when medically necessary, a state must arrange for EPSDT for needy 
children.48  In addition, the agency must ensure timely initiation of treatment, 
generally within an outer limit of six months after the request for screening 
services.49 
 
 40. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(23)(1994). 
 41. See id. § 1396u(a). 
 42. See id. § 1396u(b). 
 43. See id. § 1396u(j). 
 44. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(43), 
d(a)(4)(B), d(r) (1994).  For in depth discussion of EPSDT, see JANE PERKINS & SUSAN ZINN, 
NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, TOWARD A HEALTHY FUTURE: ENSURING EARLY AND 
PERIODIC SCREENING, DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT FOR POOR CHILDREN (1995). 
 45. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
 46. Id.  See also 42 U.S.C. §1396d(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
 47. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43)(C) (1994). 
 48. See GEORGE ANNAS, AMERICAN HEALTH LAW 186-87 (1990).  See also Doe v. Pickett, 
480 F. Supp. 1218, 1221 (S.D W.Va. 1979) (EPSDT “imposes on the states an affirmative 
obligation to see that minors actually receive necessary treatment and medical services.”). 
 49. See 42 C.F.R. § 441.56(e) (1999). 
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4. Home and community-based waiver services 
The Medicaid Act allows states to obtain waivers from the federal 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) that excuse compliance 
with otherwise applicable federal laws.50  The goal of these waiver programs is 
to provide services to persons at home or in the community and thereby avoid 
placing them in a hospital or nursing facility.  To this end, waivers can be used 
to access Medicaid services that are normally not available to Medicaid 
beneficiaries, including case management, homemaker/home health aides, 
personal care, adult day health, habilitation and respite care.51  Through these 
waiver programs states can elect to offer different groups different sets of 
services, offer the services in only certain geographic locations and waive 
certain rules for counting income to make sure more individuals are eligible. 
There are three major types of home and community-based waivers.  The 
first type of waiver allows states to provide the services to individuals who, but 
for the waiver services, would be institutionalized in a hospital, nursing 
facility, or intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded (ICF-MR).52  
Second, waivers can be used to provide home and community-based care 
services to individuals over age sixty-five who, but for the waiver services, 
would be institutionalized in a nursing facility.53  The third type of waiver is 
used to provide home and community services to children under age five who 
are infected with AIDS or who are drug dependent at birth.54 
To obtain and maintain any of these waivers, states must provide 
assurances to DHHS that: (1) necessary safeguards have been taken to protect 
the health and welfare of recipients and to assure financial accountability for 
funds expended on the services provided; (2) under the waiver, the state will 
spend less per capita than without the waiver; and (3) the state will annually 
provide information to DHHS on the waiver’s impact on the type and amount 
of medical assistance provided and on the health and welfare of recipients.55  
In addition, states providing waiver services for individuals who, under the 
 
 50. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); 42 C.F.R. § 440.180.  See generally 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(21) (1994): 
[I]f the State plan includes medical assistance in behalf of individuals 65 years of age or 
older who are patients in public institutions for mental diseases, [a State plan for medical 
assistance must] show that the State is making satisfactory progress toward developing 
and implementing a comprehensive mental health program, including provision for 
utilization of community mental health centers, nursing facilities, and other alternatives to 
care in public institutions for mental diseases. 
 51. See 42 C.F.R. § 440.180 (1999). 
 52. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); 42 C.F.R. §§441.300 – 441.302, 
440.180 (1999). 
 53. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(d) (1994). 
 54. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(e) (1994). 
 55. See id. §§ 1396n(c)(2), n(d)(2), n(e)(2). 
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first two types of waivers, would otherwise be institutionalized, must evaluate 
each recipient’s need for institutional services and inform a recipient 
determined likely to need institutional services that alternatives under the 
waiver are available and may be chosen by the recipient.56 
There are currently 240 home and community-based waiver programs in 
existence.57  Between 1990 and 1998, the number of persons with mental 
retardation/developmental disability who received services through home and 
community-based waiver programs increased by more than 200,000 persons.58 
IV. ADVOCACY TO EXPAND AND IMPROVE THE AVAILABILITY OF MEDICAID 
HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES 
Despite the number of Medicaid eligibility and service options available to 
states, there are waiting lists for the home and community-based services.  As 
noted earlier, there are various reasons for these waiting lists, including state 
budgetary constraints and provider shortages.  But while these waiting lists 
have persisted for years, individuals with disabilities, their families and 
advocates are increasingly challenging them.  In this part of the article, recent 
and ongoing federal court cases are used to illustrate three important Medicaid 
Act requirements that are being cited in the advocacy movement to expand and 
improve the availability of home and community-based services. The 
requirements are for: (1) the timely provision of home and community-based 
services and the free choice of services; (2) comprehensive home based 
treatment services for children and youth under age twenty-one; and (3) pre-
admission screening to prevent the inappropriate institutionalization of people 
with mental disabilities in nursing homes. 
A. Reasonable promptness and free choice in the delivery of services 
One of the most common problems that Medicaid beneficiaries experience 
is lengthy delay in obtaining home and community-based services.  In a 
number of states, beneficiaries have been placed on waiting lists, sometimes 
for years.  Courts are increasingly being asked whether these long delays 
violate the Medicaid Act requirement that “assistance shall be furnished with 
reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals.”59  Interestingly, the 
“reasonable promptness” provision was originally enacted in the Social 
 
 56. See id. §§ 1396n(c)(2), n(d)(2). 
 57. Arizona is a technical exception because its home and community-based waivers are 
authorized as part of its unique section 1115 demonstration waiver program. 
 58. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 5. 
 59. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) (1994).  See also 42 C.F.R. § 435.930 (“[A]gency must: (a) 
Furnish Medicaid promptly to recipients without any delay caused by the agency’s administrative 
procedures; [and] (b) Continue to furnish Medicaid regularly to all eligible individuals until they 
are found to be ineligible.”).  Id. § 435.911 (“[A]gency must establish time standards for 
determining eligibility and inform the applicant of what they are.”). 
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Security Act (of which Medicaid is a part) to address the hardship caused when 
needy individuals were placed on waiting lists or otherwise denied public 
assistance, despite the fact that they had been found eligible for that 
assistance.60 
Over the years, numerous courts have held the reasonable promptness 
provision to prohibit states from responding to administrative constraints by 
making beneficiaries wait for services.61  Doe v. Chiles,62 for example, held 
that Florida’s waiting lists for intermediate care facility services violated the 
reasonable promptness requirement and ordered the state to establish a 
reasonable waiting period for ICF services not to exceed ninety days.63 
In the home and community-based care context, plaintiffs are citing the 
reasonable promptness provision along with another Medicaid Act 
requirement, the “free choice” provision.  The free choice rule provides that 
when a state covers institutional and waiver program services, it must inform 
eligible individuals about feasible alternatives, if available under the wavier.  It 
then must allow individuals to choose whether they will receive care under the 
waiver program or in an institutional setting.64  In Cramer v. Chiles,65 the court 
found that Florida had violated the reasonable promptness and free choice 
rights of developmentally disabled Medicaid beneficiaries.  At issue was a new 
state plan that eliminated most placements in intermediate care facilities for the 
developmentally disabled.  The court found the plan to be illegal because 
 
 60. See generally H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 81-2271 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3287, 3482, 3507; H.R. REP. NO. 81-1300 (1949) (showing decision by states “not to take more 
applications or to keep eligible families on waiting lists until enough recipients could be removed 
from the assistance rolls to make a place for them . . . results in undue hardship on needy persons 
and is inappropriate in a program financed from federal funds.”).  See Jackson v. Hackney, 406 
U.S. 535, 545 (1972). 
 61. See, e.g., Sobky v. Smoley, 855 F. Supp. 1123, 1149 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (“[I]nsufficient 
funding by the State and counties of methadone maintenance treatment slots has caused 
providers . . . to place eligible individuals on waiting lists for treatment . . . precisely the sort of 
state procedure the reasonable promptness provision is designed to prevent.”); Linton v. Carney, 
779 F. Supp. 925, 936 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (limiting the number of nursing home beds that could 
be used for Medicaid patients violated the reasonable promptness provision by causing those 
patients “to experience extended delays and waiting lists in attempting to gain access to long term 
nursing home care”); Clark v. Kizer, 758 F. Supp. 572, 580 (E.D. Cal. 1990), aff’d in part and 
vacated in part on other grounds sub nom., Clark v. Coye, 967 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1992) (granting 
summary judgment on reasonable promptness claim where declarations of county public health 
officials indicated that a shortage of Medicaid-participating dentists caused frequent “delays in 
obtaining appointments for regular and emergency dental care”); Morgan v. Cohen, 665 F. Supp. 
1164, 1177 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (stating that Medicaid-covered transportation services “must be 
furnished with reasonable promptness”). 
 62. 136 F.3d 709 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 63. See id. at 720. 
 64. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(2) (1994); 42 C.F.R. § 441.302(d) (1999). 
 65. 33 F. Supp. 2d 1342 (S.D. Fla. 1999). 
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[i]t gives beneficiaries no real choice.  The beneficiary must choose between 
(1) a Home and Community-Based Waiver option which gives no assurance 
that the supports and services will meet individuals needs, and (2) a hope for a 
future ICF/DD placement.  The defendants have admitted that selecting an 
ICF/DD placement means going on a waiting list for decades unless new 
facilities are found.66 
While Cramer focused on the availability of ICF services and only 
tangentially dealt with home and community-based waiver services, 
subsequent cases are focusing directly on reasonable promptness, free choice 
and the availability of home and community-based waiver slots.  The first case, 
Benjamin H. v. Ohl,67 challenges West Virginia’s failure to make intermediate 
care level services adequately available to needy beneficiaries.  The situation 
in West Virginia was unusual.  Some years ago, the state legislature declared a 
moratorium on any new ICF-MR/DD beds, in favor of the expansion of these 
services in the community.  The state did, in fact, expand community offerings, 
in part through a Medicaid home and community-based waiver.  However, in 
April 1999, the state limited the waiver program to emergency placements and 
submitted a waiver re-application to DHHS that sought only twenty-five slots 
each year for the next five years.  These actions by the state resulted in 
immediate and growing waiting lists for intermediate care level services. 
Medicaid beneficiaries argued that this turn of events meant that ICF-level 
services were simply not operating in the state in institutional or community 
settings—even though the state included ICF-level services in its state 
Medicaid plan.  In the lawsuit, the beneficiaries alleged violations of the free 
choice and reasonable promptness requirements.  Ordering injunctive relief for 
the plaintiffs, the court was persuaded that, in this situation, the plaintiffs “are 
not confined to a limited choice.  They have no choice at all, except to languish 
on a waiting list for one unavailable service or another.”68  The court rejected 
 
 66. Id. at 1352. 
 67. No. 3:99-0338 (S.D.W. Va.) (on file with authors).  In another case, Wolf Prado-Steiman 
v. Bush, No. 98-6496 (D. Fla. 2000) (Settlement Agreement) (on file with authors), the parties 
have entered into an agreement, pending court approval.  The agreement requires provisions of 
home and community-based services in a timely manner.  The state also agrees to develop and 
implement a direct care staff training program to ensure competency in direct care delivery, use a 
client based quality assurance system, launch citizen monitoring of community services and 
undertake a comprehensive study to determine whether payment rates for community services are 
adequate.  Id. 
 68. Benjamin H. v. Ohl, No. 3:99-0338, slip op. at 26 (S.D. W. Va. July 15, 1999).  C.f. 
Makin v. Cayetano, No. 98-0097  (D. Haw. Nov. 26, 1999) (on file with authors) (distinguishing 
Benjamin H. and finding free choice provision was not violated where plaintiffs could choose to 
enter ICF-MRs).  Because the record in Makin revealed that there were remaining unfilled slots 
available at the end of a previous year when the state had allowed unspent waiver appropriations 
to lapse without an explanation, the court allowed the plaintiffs to pursue their claim under 42 
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the state’s claim that the Medicaid Act was not violated because the waiver 
alternative was not available due to the fact that the demand for slots exceeded 
the budget for the program.  Citing Martinez v. Ibarra,69 the court decided that 
feasible alternatives should be determined by the beneficiary’s needs and 
treatment plan, and not solely by the funds available to service that plan.70  In a 
March 15, 2000 order, the free choice and reasonable promptness provisions 
were found to have been violated.  The court ordered the state to allow 
individuals to apply for waiver services without delay and to make eligibility 
determinations within ninety days.  It also ordered waiting lists for waiver 
services to move at a reasonable pace, defined as ninety days from the date 
eligibility is determined.71  While the case was pending, the West Virginia 
Medicaid agency also significantly increased the number of waiver slots that it 
was seeking from DHHS. 
In Boulet v. Cellucci,72 a federal court in Massachusetts issued summary 
judgement for the plaintiffs in a similar waiting situation and ordered the state 
Medicaid agency to provide the needed services within ninety days of the 
eligibility determination.73  The Boulet plaintiffs were part of the home and 
community-based waiver program for persons who would otherwise require 
placement in an intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded.  While 
receiving some services, plaintiffs had been waiting years for “residential 
habilitation services”—services that would provide assistance with acquiring, 
retaining and improving skills related to activities of daily living.  In their 
lawsuit, the beneficiaries argued that these long waits violated Medicaid’s 
reasonable promptness requirement.  In response, the defendants argued that 
the state has the option of providing waiver services, and thus, individuals have 
no legal entitlement to such services and may not demand that the services be 
furnished promptly. However, the court rejected this position, finding that once 
 
C.F.R. § 441.302(b), which requires the agency to assure financial accountability for funds 
expended under a waiver.  Makin, slip op. at 31. 
 69. 759 F. Supp. 664 (D. Colo. 1991). 
 70. Benjamin H., slip op. at 26.  See also Lewis v. New Mexico Dep’t of Health, 94 F. Supp. 
2d 1217 (D.N.M. 2000) (rejecting the state’s argument that neither the constitution nor statute 
creates a right to participate in the waiver program because, in the case, plaintiffs did not claim an 
absolute right to the waiver program but rather the right to have their applications processed with 
reasonable promptness). 
 71. Benjamin H. v. Ohl, No. 3:99-0338 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 15, 2000).  See also Lewis, 94 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1217  (holding that plaintiffs have a private right of action to enforce reasonable 
promptness); Roland v. Celluci, 52 F. Supp. 2d 231 (D. Mass. 1999) (interpreting the reasonable 
promptness requirement); McMillan v. McCrimon, 807 F. Supp. 475 (C.D. Ill. 1992) (granting 
preliminary injunction on plaintiffs’ claim that § 1396a(a)(8) required Medicaid agency to accept 
applications for home and community-based waiver program). 
 72. No. 99-10617 (D. Mass. July 14, 2000). 
 73. Id. at 1.  The state was provided an opportunity to show cause why this 90-day time 
frame should not be used. 
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a state opts to implement a waiver program and sets out the eligibility 
requirements for that program, eligible individuals are entitled to those services 
and to the associated protections of the Medicaid Act, including reasonable 
promptness.74  It noted that requiring the state to inform individuals of their 
institutional home and community-based care alternatives—the free choice 
requirement—would have little meaning if the eligible individuals were not 
also entitled to these alternatives.75 
In Benjamin H. and Boulet, the state Medicaid agencies relied heavily on 
the fact that DHHS had approved their waivers with numerical caps on the 
number of waiver slots.  However, both cases found that the existence of these 
caps does not allow the state total discretion in providing waiver services.  In 
Benjamin H., the court found that “Medicaid provides entitlements.”76  The 
rights of entitlement were violated when the state purported to cover ICF-
related services but, in reality, did not make them available in institutional or 
home-based waiver settings.  To comply with the court’s ruling and address the 
situation, the state was, in effect, forced to expand home and community-based 
waiver slots because of the legislative moratorium on building new ICF beds.  
Meanwhile, in Boulet, plaintiffs were already receiving waiver services and, 
therefore, were viewed by the court as included under the cap.  Granting 
individuals the additional waiver services they needed could not bring the state 
over the cap.  Moreover, the court accepted, apparently without argument, that 
the state could use a numerical cap and found the cap to operate as an 
eligibility requirement such that individuals who apply after the cap has been 
reached are not eligible for the home and community-based waiver service.77  
Significantly, neither Benjamin H. nor Boulet analyzed whether the states had 
appropriately determined their numerical limits or whether the numerical caps 
might violate some other Medicaid or Americans with Disabilities Act 
provisions. 
B. Home care treatment services for children 
Child health advocates have also used the Medicaid Early and Periodic 
Screening Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) provisions to obtain services for 
children who have been placed on home and community-based waiver waiting 
lists.  Rather than attack the waiting lists directly, these advocacy efforts seek 
to fill health care gaps with the fairly comprehensive range of services that 
 
 74. Id. at 14-15. 
 75. Id. at 13. 
 76. Benjamin H. v. Ohl, No. 3:99-0338, slip op. at 24 (S.D.W. Va. July 15, 1999). 
 77. Boulet v. Celluci, No. 99-10617, slip op. at 37 (D. Mass. July 14, 2000).  See also Makin 
v. Cayetano, No. 98-0097, slip op. at 22, 28 (D. Haw. Nov. 26, 1999) (holding once the 
“population limits” of the waiver are reached, there is no entitlement to waiver services and the 
program is no longer an available alternative). 
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EPSDT can provide.  As discussed above, the EPSDT service package and 
coverage rules are broad—requiring states to cover any federal mandatory and 
optional service that is needed to correct or ameliorate a child’s physical or 
mental condition.78  A major advantage of the EPSDT statute is that it is 
clearly written and has been enforced in a number of court decisions and 
settlements.79  The disadvantage is that, on its face, the provision extends only 
to children under age twenty-one.80 
Partial settlement of a Louisiana EPSDT case, Chisholm v. Hood,81 
promises a number of positive changes designed to enhance availability of case 
management services for children with mental retardation and developmental 
disabilities.  “Case management” links the child with a trained case manager 
who assists her with obtaining needed home and institution-based health care, 
educational, vocational and social services.82  By focusing on case 
management, the settlement seeks to impact the delivery system at critical first 
contact points for the child, and assure that needed home and community-
based services are arranged and delivered in a timely manner based on the 
child’s individual treatment plan.  As a result of the Chisholm settlement, the 
state has agreed, among other things, to assure that Medicaid-participating case 
managers will possess minimum qualifications, handle a caseload of no more 
than thirty-five clients, and receive training on Medicaid and EPSDT services.  
The Medicaid agency will also mail notices of the availability of case 
management services to Medicaid-eligible families.83 
The Chisholm court has also issued a partial summary judgment for 
plaintiffs, a ruling that will help ensure the actual availability of the home-
based services when case managers seek to arrange them.84  The plaintiffs 
sought this ruling because the state Medicaid agency was severely limiting the 
availability of occupational, speech, and audiological services (i.e. physical 
therapy and related services85) to those allowed by school boards, and it 
prohibited the inclusion of these services as part of home health care.86  In this 
 
 78. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5) (1994). 
 79. See NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, EPSDT CASE DOCKET 1 (1999), available at 
http://www.healthlaw.org. 
 80. But see, e.g., Salgado v. Kirschner, 878 P.2d 659 (Ariz. banc 1994), cert. denied, 513 
U.S. 1151 (1995) (showing discussion of EPSDT in case involving transplant for an adult). 
 81. Stip. and Order of Partial Dismissal No. 97-3274 (E.D. La. Feb. 16, 2000) (on file with 
authors). 
 82. For provisions authorizing case management services, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396d(a)(19), 
1396n(g)(2) (1994). 
 83. Stip. and Order of Partial Dismissal No. 97-3274 (E.D.La. Feb. 16, 2000). 
 84. See Order and Reasons No. 97-3274 (E.D. La. Aug. 21, 2000) (on file with authors). 
 85. For provisions authorizing physical therapy and related services, see 42 U.S.C. § 
1396d(a)(11) (1994).  See also 42 C.F.R. § 440.110 (1999). 
 86. Chisholm v. Hood, No. 97-3274, slip op. at 12-15 (E.D. La. Aug. 21, 2000) (on file with 
authors). 
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August 21, 2000 ruling, the court enjoined these limitations, finding them in 
violation of EPSDT provisions which require the state to “make available a 
variety of individual and group providers qualified and willing to provide 
EPSDT services.”87 
In another case, French v. Concannon,88 children in Maine who have 
severe mental impairments also used the EPSDT provisions to address long 
waits for needed services.  A settlement was reached between the parties, 
achieving a number of positive results, including: (1) creation of a position 
within the Maine Department of Mental Health to identify children who are 
waiting for services and to ensure that treatment is being implemented; (2) 
revision of the EPSDT informational brochure and the EPSDT provider 
screening forms to allow for earlier identification of children with behavioral 
health needs; (3) hiring of additional case managers to assist these children 
with obtaining needed home care services; (4) streamlining the prior 
authorization process to allow for a more timely provision of home health care; 
and (5) creation of a new provider category, “behavioral health specialist,” 
designed to increase availability of home care providers.89 
C. Pre-admission screening and services to avoid improper 
institutionalization 
Federal pre-admission screening and annual resident review (PASARR) 
requirements prohibit nursing facilities participating in Medicaid from 
admitting a resident who is mentally ill or mentally retarded unless the state 
has determined, before admission, that the prospective resident requires the 
level of services provided by the facility and whether she requires specialized 
services.90  PASARR also requires annual review of all nursing facility 
residents who are mentally ill or mentally retarded to determine whether their 
continued placement is appropriate and whether they require specialized 
services.91  If an individual requires specialized services, the state must provide 
or arrange for the provision of the specialized services and, if the individual is 
being discharged from a facility, assure that discharge is made to an 
appropriate setting where the specialized services will be provided.92 
 
 87. See id. at 12-15, 21.  The quoted Medicaid regulation may be found at 42 C.F.R. § 
441.61(b) (1999). 
 88. Order of dismissal and agreement No. 97-CV-24-B-C (D. Me. July 1998) (on file with 
authors). 
 89. Id. 
 90. See  42 U.S.C. § 1396r(a)–(d) (1994 & Supp. IV. 1998); 42 C.F.R. §§ 483.106, 483.112 
(1999).  PASARR applies to all potential residents, whether or not they are Medicaid eligible.  
See 57 Fed. Reg. 56450, 56452 (Nov. 30, 1992). 
 91. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
 92. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 483.118(c)(2)(iii), 483.130(m)(5) (1999).  Medicaid law also requires 
that nursing facilities planning to discharge a resident provide written notice of the planned 
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Congress enacted the PASARR legislation in 1987, as part of the Nursing 
Home Reform Act,93 doing so because “[s]ubstantial numbers of mentally 
retarded and mentally ill residents were inappropriately placed in [nursing 
homes],” and “[t]hese residents often do not receive the active treatment 
services that they need.”94  It also noted that “for a number of these diagnoses, 
such as schizophrenia, depressive disorder, and anxiety disorders, active 
treatment in community settings [could] be appropriate.”95  Congress thus 
devised PASARR to prevent and remedy the unnecessary admission and 
confinement of people with psychiatric and developmental disabilities in 
nursing homes.96 
In Rolland v. Celluci,97 a class action on behalf of nursing home residents 
with mental retardation and other developmental disabilities, the plaintiffs 
alleged that the State of Massachusetts violated the PASARR requirements and 
the Americans with Disabilities Act by failing to provide specialized services 
and community-based treatment in intermediate care facilities and community 
settings that were most appropriate to the plaintiffs’ needs.98  The parties 
settled the case with an agreement that guarantees the right of all current 
Massachusetts residents of nursing facilities, who can be safely supported in 
the community, to leave the facility and live in integrated community 
settings.99  In deciding whether someone can benefit from a community setting 
the following factors will be considered: 
 
transfer or discharge.  See 42 C.F.R. § 483.12(a) (1999).  People with mental disabilities have 
discharge planning rights, including the right to assessment and planning regarding community 
services.  Hospitals must have an “effective, ongoing discharge planning program that facilitates 
the provision of follow-up care.”  42 U.S.C. § 1395x(ee) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); 42 C.F.R. §§ 
482.21(b), 482.43 (1999).  The goals of the discharge statutes are to avoid repeated institutional 
placement and to support the individual’s right to live safely in the community with appropriate 
supports. 
 93. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 §§ 4211-4218, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 
Stat. 1330 (1987). 
 94. H.R. REP. NO. 100-391, at 459-60 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-80. 
 95. Id. at 460. 
 96. Id.  See also Rolland v. Cellucci, 52 F. Supp. 2d 231, 234 (D. Mass. 1999) (explaining 
that legislation was “enacted to quell over-utilization of nursing home care for those who are not 
in need of institutionalization”); McNiece v. Jindal, No. 97-2421, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5635, at 
*4 (E.D. La. 1998) (noting the “apparent impetus for the [legislation] was the complaint that 
mentally ill and mentally retarded people were often being ‘warehoused’ in nursing homes where 
their needs were not met”). 
 97. Memorandum with Regard to Approval of Settlement Agreement, 52 F. Supp. 2d 231 
(D. Mass. 1999) (No. 98-30208) (on file with authors). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id.  The agreement also promises specialized services to all needy Massachusetts 
residents with mental retardation or developmental disabilities who currently reside in nursing 
facilities. 
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 opportunities to interact with family and friends; 
 accessibility to appropriate work or day supports; 
 opportunity for meaningful participation in aspects of community 
life; 
 the presence or absence of an advanced medical condition that 
would have a significant adverse impact on an individual’s safety; 
 the presence or absence of fragile health conditions such that the 
main supports are nursing services for medical and basic needs; 
 the presence or absence of a substantial risk of substantial transfer 
trauma which cannot be mitigated by individual clinical 
intervention; and 
 adequate levels of support in the community system to ensure 
safety.100 
The settlement provides for an independent expert to review the 
appropriateness and implementation of the state’s community placement 
process, as well as individual determinations for placement and specialized 
services.101  The agreement will cover a span of eleven years in which $5 
million will be spent each year to implement PASARR and improve and 
expand community and specialized services.  Over the course of the 
agreement, the state will offer community, residential, and other support 
appropriate to the needs of the class members.  While this agreement 
represents a compromise on a number of issues, it provides a conclusion to the 
lawsuit by ensuring that increasing numbers of individuals with mental 
retardation or other developmental disabilities will have an opportunity to live 
in integrated community settings rather than nursing facilities. 
V. THE GROWING ROLE OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION IN ASSURING 
COMMUNITY-BASED CARE 
In recent years, the movement away from institutional care and toward 
home and community-based care has been seen as a civil rights issue.  The 
broad integration mandates of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provide strong enforcement mechanisms for 
furthering this movement.  This part of the article will examine the integration 
provisions of those laws, how they apply in practice, and some of the hurdles 
advocates must overcome in the laws’ effective enforcement. 
A. Overview to the ADA 
In the ten years since its enactment, the ADA102 has changed the landscape 
for people with disabilities.  The ADA has given people with disabilities access 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 9. 
 102. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
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to arenas of public life that were previously closed.  Since enactment of the 
ADA, employers have had to re-examine old prejudices about the ability of 
people with disabilities to perform many types of jobs.  Likewise, people with 
disabilities have found opportunities for advancement in occupations that were 
previously closed to them.  All types of public accommodations, including 
medical offices, restaurants, retail stores and office buildings have had to re-
think how to make their services available to all members of the public and 
how to remove barriers created by neglect or poor design of their programs or 
physical facilities. 
The ADA’s five titles pertain to different arenas of opened access.  Title I 
opens employment opportunities and requires employers to provide reasonable 
accommodations in order that a person with a disability can perform a job.103  
Under Title II, governmental entities must open up government facilities and 
services to people with disabilities.104  Title II further requires public 
transportation that is accessible to people with disabilities.105  Public 
accommodations, including restaurants, theaters, stores and doctors’ offices, 
must remove barriers and unequal treatment of people with disabilities under 
Title III.106  Title IV requires telephone relay services to enable people with 
disabilities to communicate more effectively.107  Title V contains 
miscellaneous provisions, including prohibitions against retaliation and 
coercion, abrogation of state immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and 
certain exceptions to the ADA.108  For purposes of this article, we will 
concentrate on the provisions of Title II. 
Congress enacted the ADA under its power to regulate interstate 
commerce, and the nondiscrimination provisions are applied to the states under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.109  Currently, advocates use the ADA to effect 
changes in discriminatory practices by private entities and public entities, 
including state and local governments.  Whether Congress may constitutionally 
apply the ADA to the states and abrogate states’ immunity under the Eleventh 
Amendment will come before the U.S. Supreme Court in its current session.110 
The ADA defines disability as a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an individual, and 
the definition includes individuals with a record of such an impairment or who 
 
 103. See id. §§ 12111-12117 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
 104. See id. §§ 12131-12134 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
 105. See id. §§ 12141-12165 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
 106. See id. §§ 12181-12189 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
 107. 47 U.S.C. § 225 (1994). 
 108. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
 109. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) 
(1994). 
 110. See Garrett v. Univ. of Alabama at Birmingham Bd. of Trustees, 193 F.3d 1214 (11th 
Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 1669 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2000) (No. 99-1240). 
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are regarded as having such an impairment.111  While the definition of 
disability applies to all titles of the ADA, Title II goes on to define a “qualified 
individual with a disability” as one who, with or without reasonable 
modifications to rules, policies,  practices or removal of barriers, meets the 
essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation 
in programs or activities provided by a public entity.112  Such qualified 
individuals with a disability shall not, by reason of such disability, be excluded 
from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs or 
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such 
entity.113 
Importantly, the ADA includes segregation of persons with disabilities as a 
form of illegal discrimination.114  Congress made it the goal of the nation to 
“assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and 
economic self-sufficiency” for people with disabilities.115  The regulations 
implementing these ADA provisions also require public entities to “administer 
services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to 
the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.”116  The ADA’s 
prohibitions against segregation and endorsement of integration argue in favor 
of home and community-based service options that allow people with 
disabilities to leave segregated institutional settings in favor of all that life in 
the community has to offer. 
B. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
While the ADA tends to get much of the credit for eliminating 
discrimination against people with disabilities, its predecessor, the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”), began the federal effort 
toward ending this discrimination.  As the ADA’s applicability to the states 
may become questionable, interest has grown in reviving use of the 
Rehabilitation Act. 
Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act to forbid discrimination against 
people with disabilities in federally-funded programs.117  In significant ways, 
the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, as currently amended, parallel one 
another.  The major difference is that the ADA applies to private and public 
entities of most types, while the Rehabilitation Act requires that the offending 
entity be a recipient of federal funding.  Congress mandated that the ADA’s 
 
 111. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1994). 
 112. Id. § 12131(2). 
 113. Id. § 12132. 
 114. Id. § 12101(a)(2), (a)(5). 
 115. Id. § 12101(a)(8).  Discrimination is also found in “overly protective rules and policies.” 
42 U.S.C § 12101(a)(5) (1994). 
 116. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2000). 
 117. 29 U.S.C. § 701-796 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
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protections be construed at least as extensively as those under Title V of the 
Rehabilitation Act.118  Except for the employment context, the definition of an 
“individual with a disability” parallels that of the ADA.119  The Rehabilitation 
Act addresses discrimination in employment, housing, public accommodations, 
education, transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, 
health services, voting and public services in those activities funded by the 
federal government.120  Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act makes it illegal 
for any “otherwise qualified individual with a disability,” solely based on that 
disability to “be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, 
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any 
Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.”121 
The Rehabilitation Act, like the ADA, not only prohibits discrimination, 
but also repeatedly states the Congressional policy of fully including and 
integrating people with disabilities into the mainstream of American society 
and encouraging self-sufficiency and full participation.122  “[A]ids, benefits, 
and services . . . must afford handicapped persons equal opportunity to obtain 
the same result, to gain the same benefit or to reach the same level of 
achievement [as a nonhandicapped person], in the most integrated setting 
appropriate to the person’s needs.”123 
Similar to the Medicaid Act, the Rehabilitation Act was enacted under 
Congress’ power under the Spending Clause.124  Both Acts require the states to 
designate a sole state agency to administer state plans developed under the 
Acts,125 and, with limited exceptions, require that the state plans be in effect in 
all political subdivisions of the state.126 
 
 118. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994). 
 119. 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(A), (B) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).  The Rehabilitation Act originally 
spoke of “handicapped persons.”  Under amendments to the Act, the definition and many other 
provisions were revised to reflect current terminology and to more closely parallel the ADA. 
 120. See id. § 701(a)(5) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
 121. See id. § 794(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).  A “program or activity” includes “a 
department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or of a local 
government.”  See id. § 794(b)(1)(A). 
 122. See id. § 701(a)(3), (a)(6), (c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
 123. 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(2) (2000). 
 124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 125. 29 U.S.C. § 721(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
1396a(a)(5) (1994). 
 126. 29 U.S.C. § 721(a)(4) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
1396a(a)(1) (1994). 
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C. Olmstead v. L.C. 
In Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring,127 the Supreme Court clarified that 
segregating people with mental disabilities in an institutional setting, despite 
professional judgements that those individuals could live in the community and 
despite willingness of the individuals to live outside the institution, was 
discrimination in violation of the ADA.  The case involves two women with 
mental disabilities who were voluntarily admitted to a state hospital in Georgia 
and confined for treatment in psychiatric units.  Treatment professionals 
determined that both women could be cared for appropriately in community-
based programs, but the women remained confined.  Suit was brought under 
Title II of the ADA alleging that the state discriminated against the women 
when it failed to place them in community-based programs when the treatment 
professionals determined that such placement was appropriate.  The suit asked 
that the Court order the state to place the women in a community-based 
residential program. 
The Court held that Title II of the ADA requires states to provide persons 
with mental disabilities with community-based treatment, rather than 
institutionalization, when treatment professionals have determined that 
community placement is appropriate, the affected individual does not oppose 
the placement and the community placement can be reasonably 
accommodated, considering the state’s resources and the needs of other 
persons with mental disabilities.128  Isolation of persons with disabilities in 
institutions “perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that these individuals are 
incapable or unworthy of contributing to life in the community.”129  
Segregation also prevents individuals from enjoying the familial contacts and 
social, work, economic, educational and cultural opportunities of everyday 
life.130 
The Court also allowed the state possible defenses to community 
placement.  If a state could show that providing home or community-based 
care works a “fundamental alteration” of the state’s services for people with 
disabilities, the state may have a defense to integrating people with disabilities 
into the community.  “Fundamental alteration” requires a court to look at two 
factors: 1) the cost factor— that is, the costs of providing community-based 
care; and 2) the equity factor—that is, the range of services that a state 
provides to people with mental disabilities and any inequitable distribution of 
 
 127. 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
 128. Id. at 587. 
 129. Id. at 600 (citations omitted). 
 130. Id. at 601. 
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resources away from others with disabilities.131  We will consider these two 
factors below. 
1. The cost factor 
The L.C. decision allows a state to raise the issue of cost, i.e., resources 
available to a state, as part of the “fundamental alteration” defense to an L.C.-
type suit.132  Implicit in the cost defense is the fact that most states have 
institutions and similar facilities for people with disabilities, and, therefore, 
certain fixed costs in their budgets for mental health care.  Add to this fixed 
cost a legislature that may be reluctant to allocate funds to care for people with 
disabilities, and the cost defense could quickly hamper a discrimination 
challenge. 
Burnam and Mathis point out the difficulties of the cost defense.133  Most 
significantly, the Court was not clear how much cost was too much.134  The 
authors argue that “available resources” should include not only those 
resources that a state has chosen to allocate to programs for people with 
disabilities, but also additional resources that a state may obtain through 
additional funding, optional programs, Medicaid waivers and other 
resources.135  They also posit that courts should factor in the cost savings of 
community-based programs.136 
The cost defense is problematic for many reasons.  First, cost would seem 
an odd factor in defending against the enforcement of civil rights 
protections.137  Legislation to protect people with disabilities was modeled on 
other civil rights legislation,138 but only the post-L.C. ADA encounters the cost 
hurdle.  Cost should be an unacceptable defense in a racial, sexual or religious 
discrimination suit,139 yet in the disability context, the Court has signaled a 
willingness to consider the cost of eliminating discrimination. 
 
 131. Id. at 597.  For discussion of the fundamental alteration defense, see Ira Burnim & 
Jennifer Mathis, After Olmstead v. L.C.: Enforcing the Integration Mandate of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 33 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 633 (2000) [hereinafter After Olmstead]. 
 132. L.C., 527 U.S. at 606. 
 133. After Olmstead, supra note 131, at 640-645. 
 134. Id. at 640. 
 135. Id. at 641. 
 136. Id. at 643. 
 137. See Lucille D. Wood, Costs and the Right to Community-Based Treatment, 16 YALE L. 
& POL’Y REV. 501 (1998).  The author argues some of the differences between disability and 
other types of discrimination in regard to costs.  She also discusses different cost approaches that 
the courts have taken. 
 138. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 296 n.7 (1985). 
 139. But see Sidney D. Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI: Defending Health Care 
Discrimination—It Shouldn’t Be So Easy, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 939 (1990). 
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Second, the origins of the cost defense and the Court’s reliance on 
precedents regarding cost concerns are suspect.140  When the House considered 
the ADA, the goal of integrating people with disabilities into society was 
considered more important than cost considerations.141  As Armen Merjian 
points out, cost is only mentioned in the ADA in relation to program 
accessibility of existing facilities and communications.142  Similarly, 
“reasonable accommodation” appears in the employment regulations, but not 
in those provisions regulating community-based care.143  Thus, the Court’s 
concern with cost may have little basis in law. 
Third, home and community-based waivers often represent less expensive 
and more comprehensive alternatives to institutional care.  Providing a person 
with a disability with a home assistant to help with daily activities costs far less 
than the professional personnel needed to support the same person in an 
institutional setting.  Fourth, factoring the state’s investment in institutions into 
the equation against home or community-based placement creates an 
inappropriate comparison.  L.C. says that when treatment professionals 
determine that home or community-based care is appropriate and the person 
with disabilities agrees, the person has a right to this placement.  Under these 
circumstances, institutional care would be an inappropriate placement.  As 
such, the state’s costs for institutionalizing this person should be no more 
relevant than the state’s costs in any other programs it offers.  Consideration of 
costs contradicts Congress’ clear intent to encourage integration of people with 
disabilities into the mainstream. 
2. The equity factor 
Under the second part of the state’s possible “fundamental alteration” 
defense to a discrimination suit, the Court requires consideration of the state’s 
obligation to mete out services in an equitable manner.144  Comparison of the 
cost alone for providing community care for two individuals to the state’s 
budget for mental health services would leave the state with no real defense.145  
The Court’s concern here is that if a state maintains a range of services and 
 
 140. See Armen H. Merjian, Bad Decisions Make Bad Decisions: Davis, Arline, and 
Improper Application of the Undue Financial Burden Defense Under the Rehabilitation Act and 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 105 (1999).  The article argues that the 
cost defense is based on Court dictum which, through subsequent decisions, has been elevated to 
precedence. 
 141. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990, 
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 50 (1990). 
 142. Merjian, supra note 140, at 132-133; 42 U.S.C. § 12134(b) (1994); 28 C.F.R.§ 39.150(2) 
(2000). 
 143. Merjian, supra note 140, at 119-120; 28 C.F.R. § 41.53 (2000). 
 144. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 597 (1999). 
 145. Id. at 603-604. 
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facilities to serve people with disabilities, including home and community-
based waivers, a few individuals should not be able to leapfrog over others on 
waiting lists for the same service.146 
As Burnim and Mathis point out, the Court’s concern with the needs of 
others with disabilities should not excuse a state from providing community-
based placement just because there are others in the state with unmet needs.147  
Such an approach would always doom the plaintiffs’ case.  Since most, if not 
all, states already have some degree of unmet need, plaintiffs could only 
prevail against an equity defense if the state were to expend more resources to 
satisfy the unmet need.  Requiring the state to expend more on care for people 
with mental disabilities to satisfy that unmet need would necessarily run afoul 
of the Court’s concerns over the cost factor.  The equity defense would become 
subsumed into the cost defense every time.  The better approach entails having 
states create effective and comprehensive plans, with input from the disability 
advocacy community, for the noninstitutional care of people with disabilities in 
order to equitably distribute the state’s mental health resources. 
3. The L.C. aftermath 
Despite its potential boundaries, advocates for people with disabilities 
generally have viewed L.C. as a watershed in encouraging community-based 
placement, when appropriate, over institutionalization.  L.C. raises community-
based care to a right, rather than a preference or a mere choice.  A state that 
fails to consider and plan for community-based care runs the risk of being 
found to have discriminated against people with disabilities.  L.C. indicates 
that a court might find ADA compliance if a state has a “comprehensive, 
effectively working plan” for providing services to people with disabilities in 
the most integrated settings and a waiting list that moves at a reasonable pace 
without a motivation to keep institutions full.148 
The states have not moved quickly to take advantage of this option.  In 
light of L.C., HCFA is encouraging states to incorporate community-based care 
into their state Medicaid plans and otherwise incorporate concerns for 
providing services to people with disabilities.149  DHHS has also published 
guidance on how Medicaid can assist with transition of people with disabilities 
into the community.150  Executive orders or legislative resolutions in seven 
 
 146. Id. at 606. 
 147. After Olmstead, supra note 131, at 647. 
 148. L.C., 527 U.S. at 605-06. 
 149. See Letter from Timothy M. Westmoreland, Director, Center for Medicaid and State 
Operations, Health Care Financing Administration, and Thomas Perez, Director, Office of Civil 
Rights, to State Medicaid Directors 2 (Jan. 14, 2000), available at 
http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/smd1140a.htm; Letter from Timothy M. Westmoreland, supra 
note 28, at 3. 
 150. Id. at 1. 
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states require those states to develop L.C. compliance plans by a certain 
date.151  However, no state has developed a plan that meets the 
recommendations in the DHHS guidelines yet.152 
If and when states finally begin preparation for these plans, advocates for 
people with disabilities should have the opportunity to help shape the plans in 
ways that are effective and nondiscriminatory for the needs of their clients.  
Whether states will include advocates in the planning process remains to be 
seen. 
The interplay between Medicaid and the ADA will also be clarified.  
Medicaid offers states significant federal matching assistance to offer an 
extensive package of mandatory and optional home care services for adults and 
a comprehensive scope of benefits for children.  Given the Supreme Court’s 
discussion in L.C., states may be required to increase use of these Medicaid 
optional services and waiver programs and to more aggressively implement 
mandatory benefits.  Moreover, in contrast to the potential cost factor 
limitations to obtaining community services through the ADA,153 the role of 
budgetary constraints is more settled in the Medicaid context.  Congress 
enacted the Medicaid Act pursuant to the Spending Clause.  As such, Congress 
has offered federal matching funds to states to provide medical care to the 
needy, but it has made that federal funding available with strings attached.  
Once a state elects to participate in Medicaid, it “must comply with the 
requirements imposed both by the Act itself and by the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services.”154  Courts have repeatedly noted that “inadequate state 
appropriations do not excuse noncompliance [with the Medicaid Act].”155 
In Benjamin H. v. Ohl, the state cited the ADA to argue that the court 
could not require it to expand the availability of community-based services 
through the Medicaid program.  The court, however, noted that the authority 
for the ADA differs from that of the Medicaid Act.156  Ordering relief to 
address Medicaid waiver waiting lists, the court put it this way: 
 
 151. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY SYSTEMS, OLMSTEAD 
PROGRESS REPORT: DISABILITY ADVOCATES ASSESS STATE IMPLEMENTATION AFTER ONE 
YEAR 1 (2000), available at http://www.protectionandadvocacy.com/progressreportfinal.htm.  
Those states are Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri, North Carolina and Texas.  Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Justice Kennedy said that nothing about the ADA requires a state to create a community 
treatment program where none exists.  Rather, decisions regarding the use and shifting of 
government funds are political decisions not within the reach of the ADA.  L.C., 527 U.S. at 612-
13. 
 154. Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 37 (1981).  See also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. 
Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 502 (1990). 
 155. See, e.g., Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d. 709, 722 (11th Cir. 1998); Alabama Nursing Home 
Ass’n v. Harris, 617 F.2d 388, 396 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 156. Preliminary injunction transcript No. 3:99-0338 (S.D. W.Va. June 30, 1999). 
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Medicaid provides entitlements . . . .  Budgetary constraints are no defense for 
the failure to provide Medicaid entitlements . . . .  The reason is simple.  States 
could easily renege on their part of the Medicaid bargain by simply failing to 
appropriate sufficient funds.157 
Thus, while states may be able to cite budgetary constraints to limit their 
accommodations to achieve integration under the ADA, budgetary constraints 
alone should not excuse a state from complying with the Medicaid Act. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Over the last thirty-five years, health care services and the funding for 
these services have evolved dramatically.  Technology and other advancements 
enable individuals to live in home and community-based settings, while the 
Medicaid program offers a source of payments for these on-going health care 
needs.  Unfortunately, states have been hesitant to embrace and implement the 
federal laws that, in some cases, require and, in others, allow for the coverage 
of necessary services.  The states, like much of the general population, have 
been slow to catch up with the new possibilities and new attitudes about 
serving people with disabilities.  This article has explained Medicaid eligibility 
for and coverage of these services and provided an overview to the emerging 
advocacy movement to enforce the Medicaid Act and anti-discrimination 
protections.  In the coming years, this movement is sure to gain attention as it 
seeks to improve and expand the availability of home and community-based 
services for individuals who need them and integrate those individuals into the 
mainstream of American life. 
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